

# Phoenix Register of Shipping (PH.R.S.)

## NL 89/13 - ICS SAFETY CULTURE GUIDE

### General Information

**Refer to** : Ship Owners - Operators, PHRS Representatives  
**Ship Type** : All applicable ships  
**Attached Ref.** : ICS Safety Culture Guide 06.2013  
**Effective from** : N/A

Dear All,

We would like to draw your attention about International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) new publication for ship owners' further guidance on how shipping companies and crew can implement an effective '**safety culture**'.

The new ICS guide explains that there are three essential components to develop a safety culture: **Commitment from the top**, **Measuring performance** and **Modified behavior**. The guide also stresses the importance of an accident and '**near miss**' reporting, by establishing a '**just culture**' approach where shipping company personnel is encouraged to provide essential safety related information whenever something might have gone wrong, but without fear of punishment.

Shipowners / Operators and ICS members are invited to note **attached** ICS guide that can also be downloaded from the following web link: [www.ics-shipping.org/SafetyCulture.pdf](http://www.ics-shipping.org/SafetyCulture.pdf) in order to be ensured appropriate crew awareness.

At this point, we would like to thank you for your kind attention remaining at your disposal for any further clarification and/or further assistance you may need, without hesitating to contact with our Technical Dpt. ([mail@phrs.gr](mailto:mail@phrs.gr)).

PHRS External Dpt. - June 26<sup>th</sup> 2013, Piraeus, Greece

# IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE SAFETY CULTURE

BASIC ADVICE FOR SHIPPING COMPANIES  
AND SEAFARERS



**INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING**  
IMO Symposium on the Future of Ship Safety, 2013

# IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE BASIC ADVICE FOR SHIPPING COMPANIES AND SEAFARERS

In 2014, shipowners worldwide, as represented by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), will celebrate the remarkable improvements to maritime safety that have been achieved in the 100 years following the adoption of the first International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). This led to the development of the comprehensive international regulatory framework which the shipping industry enjoys today, and which since 1948 has been entrusted to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

In June 2013, as part of the build-up to the Centenary of SOLAS, IMO hosted a major **Symposium on the Future of Ship Safety**, in order to consider how maritime safety can be further improved in the 21st Century.

To coincide with this important event, ICS has produced this advice on the implementation of a 'safety culture' for dissemination throughout the global shipping industry.

It is hoped that this brochure will make a small contribution to the eventual achievement of the shipping industry's ultimate goal of zero accidents and zero lives lost at sea.

This brochure can be downloaded free of charge at [www.ics-shipping.org](http://www.ics-shipping.org)

Additional information on Safety Management Systems can be found in the *ICS/ISF Guidelines on the Application of the IMO ISM Code*, which is also available as an eBook.

## OVERVIEW

This brochure provides some basic advice on the successful implementation of an effective safety culture within shipping companies as required by the IMO International Safety Management (ISM) Code. The intention is to help companies, managers and seafarers to fulfil the spirit as well as the letter of the ISM Code.

Following the full implementation of the ISM Code, which became mandatory for all ships via the SOLAS Convention between 1998 and 2002, there has been a significant reduction in maritime casualties, serious oil spills, and – most importantly – the number of lives lost on board international cargo ships (see graphs).


However, a number of recent high profile incidents suggest that the absence of a fully implemented safety culture is still an issue which some shipping companies may need to address with additional rigour.

In particular, this includes the vital need for all concerned to understand the relationship between unsafe acts and serious incidents that may cause loss of life or serious damage to property and the environment. The importance of changing behaviour, and avoiding negative attitudes or complacency towards safety and environmental protection is also underlined.

As well as exploring what is meant by an effective safety culture, the following contains some basic guidance on risk assessment and risk management, which are important tools in delivering an effective safety culture.

## MARITIME CASUALTIES

Number of total losses  
(vessels over 500 tonnes)




Source: IUMI/Lloyd's List Intelligence

# IVE SAFETY CULTURE

## SERIOUS OIL SPILLS

Average number of major oil spills per year (over 700 tonnes)



Source: ITOPIF

## LIVES LOST ON BOARD

Number killed or missing on cargo ships vs world seaborne trade



Source: IHS Maritime/Clarksons


## THE ROLE OF A SAFETY CULTURE IN PREVENTING 'ACCIDENTS'

### ACCIDENT CAUSATION

An ideal SMS looks like this



Companies develop layers of defences between the hazards and people/property at risk from operations



The reality is more like this, with possible holes in the barriers, like the holes in a swiss cheese

When 'holes' in every slice line up, a poor system provides a trajectory for an accident to occur

At the risk of stating the obvious, the underlying purpose of a Safety Management System (SMS) that embraces an effective safety culture is to prevent 'accidents'. Accidents and unintended pollution incidents do not just happen – they are caused, usually by more than one factor coming together at a particular place and time. Change any one of these factors, even slightly, and the accident would probably not occur. Instead one would experience what is termed a 'hazardous occurrence' or a 'near miss' – in other words a 'near accident'.

The above illustrative model can be used to show the concept of causal factors combining to lead to an accident. The model uses the concept of 'swiss cheese slices' to represent barriers, physical and procedural, that are placed by the company to prevent accidents.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James Reason, Professor Emeritus, University of Manchester, is credited for this helpful analogy.

## SELF REGULATION

The introduction of the ISM Code in the 1990s was an attempt by governments to create a culture of self regulation of safety and pollution prevention, in which the application of a **safety culture** goes beyond unthinking compliance with externally imposed rules. The ISM Code places particular emphasis on internal management of safety, and requires companies and their personnel to establish targets for performance. Self regulation requires every individual in the company, both at sea and ashore, to be responsible for every action taken to improve safety, rather than seeing such measures as being imposed from outside. The ISM Code requires the development of both company specific and ship specific Safety Management Systems (SMS), with safety procedures that are organised by those who will be directly affected by the implications of any failure.

It may be helpful to recall that the development of regulations governing safety and environmental protection for shipping has progressed over time through interrelated stages, all of which still have relevance to the 21st Century shipping industry.

## CULTURE OF PUNISHMENT

The earliest and most basic stage of regulation concentrated on the consequences of safety failures where, in the aftermath of accidents involving personal injury or damage to the ship and cargo, efforts were made to find someone to blame. This created a culture of punishment, where the essential theme was to identify and apportion blame, often to the last person in the chain of events. The underlying principle was that the threat of punishment would influence behaviour to the extent that safety would be a higher priority.


## CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE

A second stage developed throughout the 20th Century which involved the regulation of safety by prescription, where the industry was given sets of rules and regulations to follow. For example, the provisions of the SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW Conventions, together with the Collision Regulations, Load Line Convention and various specialist IMO Codes, provide the basis of the external regulatory framework for international shipping. This stage was an advance because it was designed to attack known points of danger before actual harm occurred. This has led to the modern culture of compliance with external rules. However, a number of serious maritime accidents during the 1980s confirmed that compliance with regulation was not always enough to achieve safety and pollution prevention. Although still of utmost importance, adherence to external rules is no longer seen as an end in itself.

## CULTURE OF SELF REGULATION

The adoption by IMO of the ISM Code, and its mandatory enforcement by flag states, represented a most important step towards the creation of a new culture of self regulation in shipping, albeit imposed through a mandatory regime.

Self regulation alone is not, however, wholly effective. In order to achieve safer seas and environmental protection it is necessary for all three approaches to regulation to coexist. Each stage of regulatory development still plays a significant part in influencing company and individual behaviour.



## WHAT IS A SAFETY CULTURE?

It is important for everyone in the company, ashore and afloat, to have an understanding and appreciation of the concept of safety culture. For a safety culture to be truly effective, the company must encourage and motivate its personnel to make safety and environmental awareness their highest priorities.

While the ISM Code states that one of its key objectives is to establish a 'safety culture' in shipping companies, it does not actually define the meaning of the term. However, a safety culture may be described as the values and practices that management and personnel share to ensure that risks are always minimised and mitigated to the greatest degree possible.

In other words, with an effective safety culture, safety and pollution prevention are always the highest priority. The company and its staff will always, and automatically, think about the implications for safety of every action, rather than simply following safety procedures because they have been imposed from outside. In an effective safety culture, **everyone** employed by the company, whether a manager, Master or a junior rating, truly believes in and understands the purpose of established procedures, and will think about safety, and the means of improving it, as a matter of course.

### KEY FEATURES OF AN EFFECTIVE SAFETY CULTURE

**1.** Recognition that all accidents are preventable and only usually occur following unsafe actions or a failure to follow established procedures.

**2.** Management and personnel who think constantly about safety.

An effective safety culture will support a shipboard environment that encourages and requires all on board to proactively consider their own and others' safety. In this way individual seafarers assume responsibility for safety rather than relying on others to provide it. Through mutual respect, increasing confidence in the value of the safety culture results in a more effective Safety Management System.

**3.** Always setting targets for continuous improvement, with a goal of zero accidents and ISM Code non-conformities.

**There are perhaps three key components to developing an effective safety culture:**

- **Commitment from the top;**
- **Measuring current performance and behaviour; and**
- **Modifying behaviour.**

A safety culture will also help to eradicate any tendency towards behavioural complacency, when the need to adhere strictly to safety and pollution prevention procedures can be overlooked, either on shore or at sea, because of the misconception that if a particular type of accident has never previously happened it may never occur. Analysis of serious accidents in shipping has demonstrated that the personnel involved are usually highly trained, competent and experienced, and that the underlying cause of the accident, which could have been prevented, was a **failure to follow established procedures**.

The key to maintaining a safety culture is for all concerned to recognise that it is a matter of enlightened self interest. The crew will be less likely to be the victims of accidents, and the company can use safety culture as a means of maximising the financial benefit and cost savings that may be derived from implementing effective Safety Management Systems. It is important that companies recognise that investment in safety produces financial savings and is thus not a 'cost'. It is a fact that the improvement of safety saves money as well as lives.

### COMMITMENT FROM THE TOP

As identified by the ISM Code, commitment from the highest level of the company is vital to ensure that personnel will act safely at all times. Without commitment from senior management the efforts of everyone else in support of the Safety Management System will be wasted. To develop the commitment of senior management it is essential that they completely understand the full cost of accidents in human, environmental and financial terms.

It may sometimes be questioned why safety should be the first priority when compensation for accidents and pollution is often met by insurance, and many safety measures appear at first sight to be expensive to implement. However, it is important for senior managers and sea staff to appreciate that:

- Insurance seldom covers all losses and becomes more expensive following accidents;
- Criminal penalties for negligence can be considerable;
- During repair periods, vessels are not trading;
- Accidents and pollution fines damage a company's reputation with charterers, shareholders and personnel, including those at sea;
- Accidents lead to increased scrutiny by flag administrations and port state control inspectors; and
- Accidents and prosecutions adversely affect the public's perception of the company and of the industry as a whole.

To reiterate, commitment from the top to the fostering of an effective safety culture is a matter of enlightened self interest. Apart from the tragic human costs of death or serious injury, it is estimated that the indirect financial costs of accidents for a company are generally about three times those of insurance claims involving personnel, cargo damage or pollution.

## MEASURING CURRENT PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOUR

In order to achieve an effective safety culture it is essential to have the means to monitor the company's current performance in order to identify ways in which safety can be improved. While the SMS required by the ISM Code provides such a mechanism, a readily comprehensible means of monitoring the effectiveness of particular safety regimes and policies is the *Lost Time Incident (LTI)* rate, which is commonly used across many industries to measure personnel injuries.<sup>2</sup>


A Lost Time Incident is an incident which results in absence from work beyond the date or shift when it occurred. The LTI rate is usually calculated as the number of LTIs that occur during one million working hours, although sometimes different multiples are used.

Following the introduction of the ISM Code, research by P&I Clubs has demonstrated that if the number of personnel accidents is reduced then the number of other accidents, such as those involving damage to property or the environment will also be reduced. The goal of a company should therefore be to reduce the LTI rate to zero. Companies regarded as being at the cutting edge of safety culture seek to achieve negligible LTI rates.

The most common forms of LTIs are 'slips, trips and falls'. By adopting a culture that will prevent these and other minor injuries from occurring, lives will ultimately will be saved.<sup>3</sup>

More strikingly, research has also shown that for approximately every 330 unsafe acts or non-conformities, 30 are likely to result in minor injury. Of these 30 injuries one is statistically likely to be an LTI. Thus the prevention of 330 unsafe acts is likely to prevent a significant injury. Statistics also suggest that the prevention of 30 LTIs is likely to result with the saving of a life!

This concept is illustrated by the safety pyramid diagram below:



2 Also known as the Lost Time Accident (LTA) or Lost Time Injury (LTI).

3 Companies will also need to ensure compliance with the ILO Maritime Labour Convention, including its requirements on health and safety protection and accident prevention (Title 4, Reg 4.3). Companies should also take account of the 'ILO Code of Practice on Accident Prevention on Board Ships at Sea and in Port' and other national guidance on preventing occupational injuries. The *ISF Guidelines on the Application of the ILO Maritime Labour Convention* provides comprehensive advice.

There are a number of performance monitoring techniques that measure different accident data, or which are derived from statutory reporting requirements within national legislation. It is most important that companies employ some means of monitoring their safety performance over time.

Many companies find it useful to compare their safety records with those of other similar companies or industries. Members of the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), and the Informal Tanker Operators' Safety Forum (ITOSF), for example, compare their safety statistics, as do members of the International Support Vessel Owners' Association (ISOA). It is recognised that conditions existing in different trades cannot be readily compared, but it can be productive to establish informal arrangements with other companies operating in broadly similar circumstances to exchange information and experience.

## MODIFYING BEHAVIOUR

A key aim of a safety culture should be to modify the behaviour, where required, of company personnel so that they **'believe in safety, think safety and are committed to safety'**.

Developing an effective safety culture based on the concept of continuous improvement, personal commitment and responsibility by all, is a long term process and involves much hard work and effort. Experience gained through the proper implementation of an SMS should result in changes in behaviour, but other measures may also be required. Some companies may wish to conduct 'behavioural assessment' programmes, using outside consultants to oversee changes to the company's safety culture. For many companies, however, other approaches can also be appropriate.

It is important that employees fully understand why they are following procedures required under the SMS. They need to understand that the purpose is not simply to satisfy ISM Code auditors but to bring about actual improvements in safety.

Additional advice on accident prevention, and the introduction of safety culture, is available from P&I Clubs, classification societies, maritime administrations and national shipowners' associations. It should be fully understood that changing behaviour is a long term and continuous process. Full operational and financial commitment of senior management to the support of the company safety culture is essential.

## REPORTING ACCIDENTS, NEAR MISSES AND NON-CONFORMITIES

When a major incident occurs it is common for considerable time, effort and money to be spent establishing what happened. Following the investigation, when the causal factors are known, it is often discovered that these were apparent and visible long before the incident occurred. Reporting such events at an early stage, followed by appropriate remedial action, can prevent accidents that lead to pollution, damage, injury or loss of life.

With the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention, the ISM Code requires the company to ensure that the SMS includes procedures to investigate and analyse 'non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations'.

The need to record accident data is universally accepted. However, it is also important for the company and personnel to recognise the importance and value of reporting non-conformities and hazardous occurrences, so called 'near misses'. In particular, it is important to ensure that all personnel, both ashore and at sea, understand that when a non-conformity or near miss is reported that the intention is not to find someone to blame or punish. Rather, the identification of non-conformities or 'near misses' provides an opportunity to investigate why they occurred, since the causal factors underlying 'near misses' are fundamentally the same as those which lead to accidents resulting with injury, loss of life, or pollution.

By having an understanding of why incidents have occurred, sometimes gained by interviewing those involved, it is possible to introduce corrective action. Once a corrective action has been taken, the chances of an actual accident, resulting in injury, damage or pollution, will be greatly reduced.

**Every effort should therefore be made to modify behaviour by reassuring those who fear that reporting incidents could have negative consequences.**

## IMO GUIDANCE ON NEAR MISS REPORTING

A near miss is defined by IMO as "*a sequence of events and/or conditions that could have resulted in loss. This loss was prevented by a fortuitous break in the causal chain of events and/or conditions*".

IMO Guidance provides examples of near miss incidents and also notes that barriers may be created against near miss reporting, particularly where a blame culture exists.

Ship and shore staff should be encouraged to study the IMO Guidance in detail.<sup>4</sup> It includes the following general advice on near miss reporting:

- The ultimate objective of near miss reporting and investigating is to identify areas of concern and implement appropriate corrective actions to avoid future losses. To do so requires that reports are generated, shared, read, and acted upon. Companies are encouraged to consider whether their reports should be disseminated to a wider audience;
- It may take years for safety trends to be discerned, and so reporting should be archived and revisited on a timely basis. Near miss reports should be considered along with actual casualty or incident reports to determine trends. There should be consistency in the identification and terms used to describe causal factors across near miss and casualty/incident reports.


## THE 'JUST CULTURE' APPROACH

The IMO Guidance referred to above also addresses the question of 'blame culture' by recommending that the industry should instead develop a 'just culture' approach.


A 'just culture' features an atmosphere of responsible behaviour and trust whereby people are encouraged to provide essential safety related information without fear of punishment. However, this is qualified by recognising that a distinction must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Unacceptable behaviour cannot be ignored and individuals must still face consequences if they engage in it.

Within the context of a 'just culture' it is essential that the company clearly defines the circumstances under which they will guarantee a non-disciplinary outcome and confidentiality. It is important that companies provide training and information about their approach to adopting a 'just culture' for sea staff, as well as for shore management and superintendents.

<sup>4</sup> IMO Guidance on Near Miss Reporting (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7, October 2008).



Further information on Safety Management Systems and the implementation of an effective safety culture can be found in the *ICS/ISF Guidelines on the Application of the IMO International Safety Management (ISM) Code*.



The ILO Maritime Labour Convention will enter into force in August 2013. The new obligations of ship operators with regard to seafarers' health and safety are among the issues covered by the new *ISF Guidelines on the Application of the ILO Maritime Labour Convention*.



Compliance with the complex rest hour regulations under STCW 2010 and the ILO MLC is crucial for safety and accident prevention. The *ISF Watchkeeper* software allows shipping companies to maintain records of individual seafarers' hours of work and rest, and plan future workload to prevent fatigue.

For information on *ISF Watchkeeper* products visit [www.isfwatchkeeper.com](http://www.isfwatchkeeper.com)

Cover image: with thanks to BW Shipping Managers PTE, Singapore

The assistance of Dr Phil Anderson, Master Mariner, and ConsultISM Ltd is acknowledged

Published in June 2013 by

### **International Chamber of Shipping**

38 St Mary Axe  
London  
EC3A 8BH

Telephone + 44 20 7090 1460  
[info@ics-shipping.org](mailto:info@ics-shipping.org)  
[www.ics-shipping.org](http://www.ics-shipping.org)

